Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305226 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
I4R Discussion Paper Series No. 178
Verlag: 
Institute for Replication (I4R), s.l.
Zusammenfassung: 
Mattingly (2024) investigates how authoritarian leaders select military generals, focusing on the People's Liberation Army of China. Three main findings emerge. First, in general, Chinese leaders consider both personal ties (as a proxy for loyalty to the leader) and combat experience (as a proxy for competence) when promoting military officers. Second, personal ties are particularly relevant during periods of domestic threat. Third, combat experience only matters during periods of foreign threat. We successfully replicate all main results with Mattingly's (2024) database, only identifying minimal differences in calculated standard errors when employing Stata instead of R. However, results differ substantially in sign, magnitude, and statistical precision once we employ alternative, data-driven approaches to defining periods of domestic threat. Alternative specification results pertaining to foreign threat periods are more robust in sign but also vary in terms of magnitude and levels of statistical relevance.
Schlagwörter: 
Guardianship Dilemma
ChineseMilitary
Promotion as General
Foreign and Domestic Threats
Career Ties
Combat Experience
JEL: 
C81
C87
D74
F52
H56
N45
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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