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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 1515
Verlag: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, I explore the relationship between wage bargaining and capital accumulation by developing a differential game in which a monopolistic union sets the wage of its members by taking as given the optimal employment strategy of a representative firm and the way in which capital is evaluated over time. Under the assumption that investment amounts to a constant share of produced output, I show that a meaningful open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium requires the union to be more patient than the firm. Moreover, relying on some numerical simulations, I show that although adjustments towards the steady-state equilibrium occur through damped oscillations, after an initial period of decline, the model predicts a stable union wage premium.
Schlagwörter: 
Monopoly union model
Capital accumulation
Binding wage contracts
Differential games
Open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
JEL: 
J31
J51
J52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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