Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493 
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dc.contributor.authorDragu, Tiberiuen
dc.contributor.authorPolborn, Mattiasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-04-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:15Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:15Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493-
dc.description.abstractHow does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a government, a minority community, and a representative voter. All actors share the objective of terrorism prevention and have symmetric information. We show that electoral pressures to be successful in terrorism prevention create a commitment problem for the government and this can lead to less security. If the representative voter cares more about terrorism prevention, the government intensifies anti-terrorism activities that are under its direct control, but cooperation by the minority community weakens, and, as a result, security may decrease. We also show that commitment to ex-post suboptimal anti-terrorism activity is desirable for the government, but such commitment is difficult to achieve without explicit institutional constraints such as an effective judicial review on government's antiterrorism actions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2864en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordterrorismen
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen
dc.subject.keywordaccountabilityen
dc.titleTerrorism prevention and electoral accountability-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn615599575en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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