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dc.contributor.authorChoi, Jay Pilen
dc.contributor.authorGerlach, Heiko A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:08Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:08Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30483-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: desisting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We also consider policy implications of our analysis regarding an antitrust authority's investment decision in cartel enforcement.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2632en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcartel formationen
dc.subject.keyworddemand linkageen
dc.subject.keywordantitrust enforcementen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen
dc.subject.stwKartellverfahrenen
dc.subject.stwNachfrageen
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMulti-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603308007en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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