Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30483
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dc.contributor.authorChoi, Jay Pilen_US
dc.contributor.authorGerlach, Heiko A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:08Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:08Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30483-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: desisting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We also consider policy implications of our analysis regarding an antitrust authority's investment decision in cartel enforcement.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2632en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcartel formationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddemand linkageen_US
dc.subject.keywordantitrust enforcementen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwNachfrageen_US
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMulti-market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcementen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603308007en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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