Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30467
Authors: 
Noussair, Charles N.
Tan, Fangfang
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2763
Abstract: 
We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice.
Subjects: 
voting
punishment
voluntary contributions
heterogeneity
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D74
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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