Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30464
Authors: 
Vives, Xavier
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2906
Abstract: 
A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions.
Subjects: 
adverse selection
market power
reverse auctions
bid shading
JEL: 
D44
D82
G14
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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