Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30440
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Fiva, Jon H. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Natvik, Gisle James | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-31 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:19:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:19:38Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30440 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects the incumbents' investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between physical capital and flow variables in government production. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2709 | en |
dc.subject.jel | E62 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H40 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political economics | en |
dc.subject.keyword | strategic capital accumulation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | identifying popularity shocks | en |
dc.subject.stw | Infrastrukturinvestition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliche Investition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wiederwahl | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Do re-election probabilities influence public investment? | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 605748527 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.