Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30412
Authors: 
Bierbrauer, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2663
Abstract: 
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
Subjects: 
public goods
mechanism design
incomplete contracts
regulations
JEL: 
D82
H41
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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