Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/302732 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11247
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
We study a large-scale intervention designed by civil society organizations to reduce vote buying in Uganda's 2016 elections. We study this intervention in light of a model where incumbents benefit from a first-mover and valence advantage, vote buying and campaigning are complementary, and voter reciprocity increases the effectiveness of vote buying. The intervention undermined reciprocity as well as the valence advantage of incumbents. As a result, challengers not only campaigned more intensively but also bought more votes in treated locations. Consistent with incumbents being first movers in markets for votes and facing more frictions to adjust their strategies than challengers, their response to the intervention was limited. The intervention ultimately failed to reduce vote buying, but led to short-run electoral gains for challengers and increased service delivery in treated locations.
Subjects: 
elections
voting behaviour
field experiment
Africa
JEL: 
C93
D72
O55
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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