Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30175 
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dc.contributor.authorBannier, Christina E.en
dc.contributor.authorBehr, Patricken
dc.contributor.authorGüttler, Andréen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-10-
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-10T12:54:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-10T12:54:46Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009110909en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30175-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Both self-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonable explanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996 and December 2006 show that rating conservatism may play a role for industrial firms, but self-selection cannot be fully rejected. Neither can it for insurance companies, though data restrictions impede further conclusions. For unsolicited bank ratings, however, we find strong evidence that rating conservatism is an important cause. The downward bias also appears to increase along with banks’ opaqueness.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFrankfurt School of Finance & Management |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFrankfurt School - Working Paper Series |x133en
dc.subject.jelG15en
dc.subject.jelG24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordUnsolicited Ratingsen
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Selectionen
dc.subject.keywordConservatismen
dc.subject.keywordOpaquenessen
dc.titleRating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn614142490en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:133en

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