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dc.contributor.authorBudzinski, Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorRuhmer, Isabelen_US
dc.description.abstractAdvances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust and, therefore, its technical potential is far from being comprehensively exploited and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art merger simulation models and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, merger simulation models represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with other, more traditional instruments of competition policy in order to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects.en_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics |cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJoint discussion paper series in economics |x2008,07en_US
dc.subject.keywordmerger simulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmerger controlen_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopoly theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordauction modelsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmergers & acquisitionsen_US
dc.titleMerger simulation in competition policy: a surveyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US

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