Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30102
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dc.contributor.authorCalahorrano, Lenaen_US
dc.contributor.authorLorz, Jens Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:40:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:40:34Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30102-
dc.description.abstractIn this note we analyze how aging affects immigration policy. We set up a dynamic political-economy model of representative democracy in which the government of the destination country sets the immigration level to maximize aggregate welfare of the constituency. Aging, i.e. a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration. This immigration effect may even overcompensate the initial decline in population growth such that the total labor force grows more strongly and the capital stock per worker declines. We also compare our results to the social planner allocation and to the median-voter equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics |cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJoint discussion paper series in economics |x2009,26en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelF22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDemographic changeen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordimmigration policyen_US
dc.titleAging, factor returns, and immigration policyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603934838en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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