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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] KDI Journal of Economic Policy [ISSN:] 2586-4130 [Volume:] 46 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 21-43
Verlag: 
Korea Development Institute (KDI), Sejong
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a new theoretical rationale for public procurement for innovation (PPI), a unique policy encouraging public procurers to purchase innovative products. In contrast to existing studies that primarily emphasize the advantages of PPI, this paper takes a comprehensive approach, examining both the costs and risks associated with PPI, alongside its benefits. It finds a general condition under which PPI outperforms traditional public procurement. Under this condition, this paper demonstrates that PPI enhances social welfare by facilitating optimal risk-sharing between public procurers and the general economy. Additionally, it draws policy implications from a comparative analysis between the current PPI policy in Korea and an optimal PPI policy.
Schlagwörter: 
Public Procurement for Innovation
Optimal Risk Sharing
State-Owned Enterprises
JEL: 
D86
H57
O38
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