Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30030
Authors: 
Rogge, Karoline S.
Linden, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper sustainability and innovation S1/2010
Abstract: 
In this paper, we conduct a cross-country quantitative analysis of the replacement incentives generated by the EU ETS for the power sector in 2008-12. In order to do so, the allocation rules of the Member States are applied to concrete reference power plants for three different fuel types (lignite, hard coal and gas). Based on these calculations, we compare installation-specific replacement in-centives across the Member States. Our analysis shows that replacement incentives vary significantly across Member States and typically deviate from the incentives provided in the reference case of full auctioning. Furthermore, the EU ETS allocation rules lead to perverse incentives in approximately 30% of the possible replacement options. Only 5 MS do not provide any perverse incentives. Finally, we explore the link between replacement incentives and allocation types. Based on our findings, we derive policy recommendations for the design of emission trading schemes emerging around the world.
Subjects: 
EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS)
replacement
adoption
diffusion
power sector
allocation rules
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
646.69 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.