Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300192 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 11.2024
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
We study effort provision and incentivisation in a Tullock group-contest with m Ï 2 groups that differ in size. A novel algorithmic procedure is presented that, under a symmetry assumption, explicitly characterises the equilibrium. Endogenous, optimal incentivisation schemes are then determined. Four results ensue. First, strategic interactions endogenously come in mean-field form: individual effort provision responds to the aggregate effort and average egalitarianism across groups. Therefore, the game is aggregative. Second, individuals endlessly cycle between zero and positive effort provision at some incentivisation schemes: no pure-strategy equilibria exist in these cases. Third, group size determines whether the egalitarianism of endogenous schemes increases or decreases in the average egalitarianism across groups. Fourth, all groups provide effort at the endogenous schemes if incentivisation is properly restricted.
Subjects: 
Collective-action problem
Conflict
Selective incentives
Strategic complements and substitutes
JEL: 
C72
D71
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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