Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30012 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 10-006
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain ("house money") or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. Moreover, we analyse whether the way of preference elicitation affects the explanatory power of inequality aversion in social dilemma situations. Our results indicate that individual inequality aversion is not generally robust to the way endowments emerge. Furthermore, the use of money earned by real efforts instead of house money does not improve the generally low predictive power of the inequality aversion model. Hypotheses based on the inequality aversion model lose their predictive power when preferences are elicited with earned money.
Schlagwörter: 
individual preferences
inequality aversion
experimental economics
prisoner's dilemma
house money
JEL: 
C91
C92
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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