Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/300050 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11122
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a new model to study the effect of contract externalities that arise through shock transmission. We model a financial network where good firms enjoy direct and indirect benefits from linking with one another. Bad risks benefit from having a connection with a good firm, but they are a cost to both direct and indirect connections. In efficient networks the good risks should form large connected components with very few bad risks attached. The equilibrium networks, on the other hand, have many more bad risks attached, they are core-periphery structures, and components are also smaller than the efficient ones. We also study extensions with heterogenous "bad risks," with diversity in the costs to good risk firms of linking with bad risks, and with incomplete information.
Schlagwörter: 
network formation
financial shocks
financial contagion
core periphery
efficiency and equilibrium
JEL: 
D85
G21
G32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.