Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29901 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Ruhr Economic Papers No. 116
Verlag: 
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
Conflict parties are frequently involved into more than one conflict at a given time. In this paper the interrelated structure of conflictive relations is modeled as a conflict network where opponents are embedded in a local structure of bilateral conflicts. Conflict parties invest in specific conflict technology to attack their respective rivals and defend their own resources. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this conflict game and examine the relation between aggregated equilibrium investment (interpreted as conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. The derived results have implications for peaceful resolutions of conflicts because neglecting the fact that opponents are embedded into an interrelated conflict structure might have adverse consequences for conflict intensity.
Schlagwörter: 
Network games
conflicts
conflict resolution
JEL: 
C72
D74
D85
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-129-6
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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