Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29871 
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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en
dc.contributor.authorFrey, Bruno S.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:27:56Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:27:56Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29871-
dc.description.abstractThe traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. It is often argued that reciprocity norms which establish a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shape tax morale to a large extent. In that respect, a case study of Switzerland may be useful because the small size of the cantons and their direct democratic political systems procedurally establish a close exchange relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In this paper, evidence is discussed on how tax morale in Switzerland evolved over time. In addition, the impact of economic, legal, socio- demographic, psychological and institutional factors on Swiss tax evasion is analyzed. It can be concluded that Switzerland’s system of responsive regulation increases tax morale.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMarburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge |x2004,26en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax Evasionen
dc.subject.keywordTax Moraleen
dc.subject.keywordDeterrenceen
dc.subject.keywordResponsive Regulationen
dc.subject.stwSteuermoralen
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen
dc.subject.stwBürgerbeteiligungen
dc.subject.stwSchweizen
dc.titleIllegal, immoral, fattening or what?: How deterrence and responsive regulation shape tax morale-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn506452751en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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