Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29849
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dc.contributor.authorKorn, Evelynen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:16:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:16:41Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29849-
dc.description.abstractIn July 2001 the 70-year-old German Rabattgesetz that prevented negotiations in retail business has been abolished. During the abolition process consumer- as well as retailer pressure groups claimed that significant damages for their clients were to be expected. Using game theoretic modelling this paper discusses which economic consequences could arise from the amendment. It shows that none of the abovementioned fears were justified. In addition, it uses a revealed-preference argument based on these predictions and on data concerning the dissemination of customer cards to describe consumers' general attitudes towards bargaining.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMarburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge |x2007,12en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleSales-discount regulation : how much bazaar do consumers want?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn606249648en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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