Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29847 
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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:15:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:15:40Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29847-
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of state interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-Universität Marburg, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMarburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge |x2004,18en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBudget Referendumsen
dc.subject.keywordIntergovernmental Grantsen
dc.subject.keywordInterest Group Influenceen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwSchweizen
dc.titleVoters as a hard budget constraint: on the determination of intergovernmental grants-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn506412989en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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