Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29837
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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:10:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:10:33Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29837-
dc.description.abstractStarting from the economic theory of federalism, this chapter surveys the development of EU revenue, spending and off-budget activities, discusses the redistributive impact of EU finances on member states, and budgetary decision-making procedures. The analysis is guided by a political economics perspective on the interaction between the different players in EU decision-making and the institutional restrictions they face. This involves the interests of the Commission, the Parliament as well as those of the single countries in the Council. They are restricted by the system of member states’ contributions to the EU and the balanced budget requirement, but also by the budgetary procedures that determine individual decision-making powers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.|cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMarburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge|x2004,11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzwirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleEuropean public finances: much ado about nothing?en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn506410633en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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