Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/297999 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 422
Publisher: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Experiments are an important tool in economic research. However, it is unclear to which extent the control of experiments extends to the perceptions subjects form of such experimental decision situations. This paper is the first to explicitly elicit perceptions of the dictator and trust game and shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects perceive the same game. Moreover, game perceptions depend not only on the game itself but also on the order of games (i.e., the broader experimental context in which the game is embedded) and the subject herself. This highlights that the control of experiments does not necessarily extend to game perceptions. The paper also demonstrates that perceptions are correlated with game behavior and moderate the relationship between game behavior and field behavior, thereby underscoring the importance and relevance of game perceptions for economic research.
Subjects: 
dictator game
trust game
game perceptions
JEL: 
C90
D01
D91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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