Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/297469 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Contemporary Economics [ISSN:] 2300-8814 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 63-78
Verlag: 
University of Finance and Management in Warsaw, Faculty of Management and Finance, Warsaw
Zusammenfassung: 
The present paper aims to provide empirical evidence regarding the impact of shareholder activism on earnings management. Specifically, it is focused on investigating the moderating role of an external governance mechanism such as external audit quality. Based on a sample of French companies listed on the French stock market index (SBF 120 index) from 2008 to 2012, we apply several multiple regressions using a standard methodology devised by Aiken and West (1991). We find that external audit quality plays a moderating role between shareholder activism and earnings management in such a way that it greatly helps to attenuate the relationship in the presence of high-quality external audits.
Schlagwörter: 
shareholder activism
discretionary accruals
earnings management
audit quality index
JEL: 
M41
M42
M48
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