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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 3 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 977-1006
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relation over tests needs not comply with Blackwell's (1951) order. Our findings may shed light on phenomena such as grade inflation and information coarsening.
Schlagwörter: 
information design
Signaling games
strategic information transmission
strategic learning
JEL: 
D82
D83
C72
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