Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2957
Authors: 
Stolpe, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 1156
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the efficiency of venture capital and its impact on primary equity markets in France and Germany. It shows that venture capital operates according to the signalling model in France and according to the learning model in Germany. Only the learning model can serve as a rationale for government subsidies. In the signalling model, many young venture capital firms succeed without a protected learning period because they already excel in the screening, monitoring and management supporting services they provide. They will seek to signal their quality to outsiders by taking portfolio firms public early. A variety of empirical tests and policy implications are discussed.
Subjects: 
initial public offerings
underpricing
learning-by-doing
signalling
new technology-based firms
venture capital
JEL: 
G14
G15
G18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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