Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29563 
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dc.contributor.authorWenzel, Tobiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-13T14:02:06Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-13T14:02:06Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29563-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies ATM coalitions in retail banking. We ask when it is profitable for banks to make agreements which ban direct ATM transaction fees. In the case of a coalition banks loose income from ATM transactions but relax competition in the banking market. We find that such agreements are profitable when the interchange fee is sufficiently high. When banks can collude on the interchange they always form a coalition. Coalitions may harm consumers but lead to higher total welfare. Moreover, we find that smaller banks have larger incentives to form ATM coalitions. Investment in ATM networks is typically higher with a coalition.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW) |cNürnbergen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIWQW Discussion Papers |x05/2008en
dc.subject.jelL1en
dc.subject.jelG2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBanking competitionen
dc.subject.keywordATM networksen
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.stwBankautomationen
dc.subject.stwBusiness Networken
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen
dc.subject.stwBanken
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOn the incentives to form strategic coalitions in ATM markets-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612498271en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:052008en

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