Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29553 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IWQW Discussion Papers No. 03/2008
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung (IWQW), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners.
Schlagwörter: 
Experimental Economics
Mechanism Design
Implementation
Linking
Bayesian Equilibrium
Efficiency
JEL: 
A13
C72
C91
C92
D64
D72
D80
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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