Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29553
Authors: 
Engelmann, Dirk
Grimm, Veronika
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
IWQW discussion paper series 03/2008
Abstract: 
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners.
Subjects: 
Experimental Economics
Mechanism Design
Implementation
Linking
Bayesian Equilibrium
Efficiency
JEL: 
A13
C72
C91
C92
D64
D72
D80
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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