Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290390.2 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2024-201r
Versionsangabe: 
revised September 2025
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary transfers, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by equal-treatment-of-equals, ex-post efficiency and probabilistic monotonicity – whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment arising should not decrease. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent to it on the universal domain of strict preferences; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin-monotonicity.
Schlagwörter: 
Random Assignment
Random Priority
Random Serial Dictatorship
Ex-Post Efficiency
Probabilistic Monotonicity
Maskin Monotonicity
JEL: 
C70
C78
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
652.02 kB




Versionsverlauf
Version Dokument Versionsbeschreibung
2 10419/290390.2 Revised version: September 2025
1 10419/290390 First version: April 2024

Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.