Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290390 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2024-201
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive one object. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial Dictatorship, is characterized by symmetry, ex-post efficiency, and probabilistic (Maskin) monotonicity - whenever preferences change so that a given deterministic assignment is ranked weakly higher by all agents, the probability of that assignment being chosen should be weakly larger. Probabilistic monotonicity implies strategy-proofness for random assignment problems and is equivalent on a general social choice domain; for deterministic rules it coincides with Maskin monotonicity.
Subjects: 
Random Assignment
Random Priority
Random Serial Dictatorship
Ex-Post Efficiency
Probabilistic Monotonicity
Maskin Monotonicity
JEL: 
C70
C78
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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