Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290178 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Finance [ISSN:] 1540-6261 [Volume:] 79 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 257-304
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.