Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289588 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 1421
Publisher: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Abstract: 
The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) theory of the firm states that, in strategic markets, social actions lead to a prisoner's dilemma. This paper develops a model with pollution externalities and environmental taxation to incentivise firms' abatement activities through green R&D investments. When the firms' objective function embed environmental issues (Environmental CSR, ECSR), a large spectrum of Nash equilibria emerges, from the Pareto inefficient to the Pareto efficient (ECSR,ECSR), depending on social concern and product differentiation degree. The time (in)consistency policy affects the endogenous market structure of the ECSR decision game more than in the standard CSR without abatement and taxation.
Subjects: 
Abatement
Corporate Social Responsibility
Duopoly
Emissions
JEL: 
H23
L13
M14
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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