Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289575 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 289
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
We study information transmission through informal elections. Our leading example is that of protests in which there may be positive costs or benefits of participation. The aggregate turnout provides information to a policy maker. However, the presence of activists adds noise to the turnout. The interplay between noise and participation costs leads to strategic substitution and complementarity effects in citizens' participation choices, and we characterize the implications for the informativeness of protests. In particular, we show that rather than being a friction, costs may facilitate information transmission by lending credibility to protest participation.
Subjects: 
Political
Institutions
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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