Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289563 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 443
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by pointing out that equilibrium constructions known from the literature extend to our class of games. However, we also note that, irrespective of the tie-breaking rule, the equilibrium set is excessively large. Specifically, any pure strategy that allocates at most twice the fair share to each battlefield is used with positive probability in some equilibrium. Furthermore, refinements based on the elimination of weakly dominated strategies prove ineffective. To derive specific predictions amid this multiplicity, we compute strategies resulting from long-run adaptive learning.
Subjects: 
Colonel Blotto games
multidimensional strategic reasoning
tie-breaking rules
Nash equilibrium
dominated strategies
adaptive learning
JEL: 
C72
C91
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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