Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288939 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Optimization Letters [ISSN:] 1862-4480 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1293-1302
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Kurz and Napel (Optim Lett 10(6):1245–1256, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-015-0917-0) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for real-world voting rules and the authors posed the exact determination as a challenge. Recently, Chen et al. (An upper bound on the dimension of the voting system of the European Union Council under the Lisbon rules, 2019, arXiv:1907.09711) showed that the dimension is at most 24. We provide the first improved lower bound and show that the dimension is at least 8.
Subjects: 
Simple games
Weighted games
Dimension
Real-world voting systems
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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