Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288711 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of the Economic Science Association [ISSN:] 2199-6784 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 43-56
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
This article studies whether people want to control what information on their own past pro-social behavior is revealed to others. Participants are assigned a color that depends on their past pro-social behavior. They can spend money to manipulate the probability with which their color is revealed to another participant. The data show that participants are more likely to reveal colors with more favorable informational content. This pattern is not found in a control treatment in which colors are randomly assigned, thus revealing nothing about past pro-social behavior. Regression analysis confirms these findings, also when controlling for past pro-social behavior. These results complement the existing empirical evidence, confirming that people strategically and, therefore, consciously manipulate their social image.
Schlagwörter: 
Social signaling
Altruism
Trustworthiness
JEL: 
C91
D03
D83
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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