Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288463 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Law and Economics [ISSN:] 1572-9990 [Volume:] 49 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 165-186
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We investigate empirically how electoral democracy and judicial independence relate to personal freedom. While judicial independence is positively and robustly related to personal freedom in all its forms, electoral democracy displays a robust, positive relationship with only two out of seven types of personal freedom (freedom of association, assembly and civil society; freedom of expression and information). Interaction terms and more refined indicators of the political system reveal that countries without elections or with only one political party benefit more from judicial independence than both democracies and multi-party systems without free elections.
Subjects: 
Freedom
Democracy
Judicial independence
Political economy
Institutions
JEL: 
D63
D72
D78
K36
K38
P48
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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