Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288151 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Industrial Economics [ISSN:] 1467-6451 [Volume:] 71 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1121-1145
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
A monopolistic manufacturer produces a branded good that is sold to final consumers by a monopolistic retailer who also sells a private label. The costs of the private label are unobserved by the manufacturer, which affects the terms of the contract offered by the manufacturer to the retailer. Given the revelation principle, the manufacturer distorts the quantity of the branded product downwards to learn those costs. The manufacturer can further reduce the retailer's information rent by distorting the quantity of the private label upwards—but this quantity is typically beyond its control. The optimum can nonetheless be achieved when combining a quantity discount with an end‐of‐year repayment.
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Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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