Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288062 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Industrial Economics [ISSN:] 1467-6451 [Volume:] 71 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 855-882
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long‐distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth‐telling behavior and restores first‐best welfare.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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