Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287174 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] International Tax and Public Finance [ISSN:] 1573-6970 [Volume:] 29 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1294-1320
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
If an individual's health costs are U-shaped in weight with a minimum at some healthy level and if the individual has both self-control problems and rational motives for over- or underweight, the optimal paternalistic tax on calorie intake mitigates the individual's weight problem (intensive margin), but does not induce the individual to choose healthy weight (extensive margin). Implementing healthy weight by a calorie tax is not only inferior to paternalistic taxation, but may even be worse than not taxing the individual at all. With heterogeneous individuals, the optimal uniform paternalistic tax may have the negative side effect of reducing calorie intake of the under- and normal weights. We confirm these theoretical insights by an empirical calibration to US adults.
Schlagwörter: 
Sin tax
Paternalism
Obesity
Extensive versus intensive margin
JEL: 
D03
D11
H21
I18
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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