Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287146 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Review of International Organizations [ISSN:] 1559-744X [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 689-719
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
While existing research has suggested that delegating foreign aid allocation decisions to a multilateral aid fund may incentivize recipient countries to invest in bureaucratic quality, our analysis links the fund's decision rules to recipient-country investment by explicitly modeling the decision-making within multilateral aid funds. We find that majority rule induces stronger competition between recipients, resulting in higher investments in bureaucratic quality. Despite this advantage, unanimity can still be optimal since the increased investment under majority comes at the cost of low aid allocation to countries in the minority. The qualitative predictions of our model rationalize our novel empirical finding that, relative to organizations that use a consensus rule, organizations that use majority are more responsive to changes in recipient-country quality.
Subjects: 
Aid allocation
Aid effectiveness
International organizations
Decision rules
JEL: 
F35
O19
H87
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.