Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286894 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Law and Economics [ISSN:] 1572-9990 [Volume:] 54 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 63-81
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
The COVID-19 pandemic has not only caused millions to die and even more to lose their jobs, it has also prompted more governments to simultaneously declare a state of emergency than ever before enabling us to compare their decisions more directly. States of emergency usually imply the extension of executive powers that diminishes the powers of other branches of government, as well as to the civil liberties of individuals. Here, we analyze the use of emergency provisions during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and find that it can be largely explained by drawing on political economy. It does, hence, not constitute an exception. We show that many governments have (mis-)used the pandemic as a pretext to curtail media freedom. We further show that executive decrees are considered as a substitute for states of emergency by many governments.
Subjects: 
COVID-19
Constitutional emergency provisions
State of emergency
Media freedom
Executive decrees
JEL: 
K40
Z13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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