Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286876 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Public Choice [ISSN:] 1573-7101 [Volume:] 190 [Issue:] 1-2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 75-92
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the committee chair is said to be more powerful. Players with a veto right are even more powerful still. Similarly, the production of threshold public goods may involve "tie-breaking players" (with more effective contributions) and "veto players" (specialists or larger players) whose contributions are necessary. We pose the question of whether power is beneficial for an individual. Except in the equilibrium where no player contributes, veto players are disadvantaged while tie-breaking players can be advantaged. In experiments with otherwise symmetric players, about 80% of the veto players contribute, but tie-breaking players also contribute almost as frequently as veto players, and significantly more frequently than ordinary players. Even with three times the costs of ordinary players, veto players stick to their behavior, while tie-breaking players reduce their contributions below those of ordinary players. Overall, powerful players always are worse off than ordinary players; thus, power seems not to pay off herein.
Subjects: 
Veto players
Tie-breaking power
Binary threshold public goods
Voting games
Choice experiments
JEL: 
D71
D72
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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