Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286757 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1432-0479 [Volume:] 74 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 763-792
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
A contestant’s effort depends on her knowledge of her rival’s type. This knowledge is often limited in real-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has commitment power to verifiably disclose contestants’ types. We investigate the optimal disclosure policy to stimulate contestants’ efforts. Full disclosure stimulates more (less) effort than full concealment if high-types are more (less) likely than low-types. However, regardless of the likelihood of types, the optimal policy is that of contingent disclosure; it is optimal to commit to disclosing if both contestants are high types and concealing otherwise.
Schlagwörter: 
Contests
Strategic complements
Strategic substitutes
Information
JEL: 
C72
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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