Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28523 
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dc.contributor.authorRogge, Karoline S.en
dc.contributor.authorSchleich, Joachimen
dc.contributor.authorBetz, Reginaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-13-
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-27T09:56:26Z-
dc.date.available2009-11-27T09:56:26Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:0011-n-494736en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28523-
dc.description.abstractBased on 18 National Allocation Plans (NAP) for phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), we explore to which extent individual Member States (MS) intend to use the ETS effectively and efficiently to reduce CO2 emissions. Our analyses at the macro level of these NAPs show that on average the ET-budgets in phase 2 are only about 3 % lower than the budgets in phase 1 (2005-2007), historical emissions in 2005 and projected emissions in 2010. While on average, the old MS intend to reduce emissions by about 10 %, compared to projected emissions, the im-plied excess allocation in the new MS is more than 20 %. When compared with a cost-efficient split of the required emission reductions, the ET-budgets in the EU-15 MS are generally too large. Thus, the burden for non-trading sectors (households, tertiary and transport) will be too high. Noteworthy are also the high shares of governments' intended and companies' possible use of Kyoto Mechanisms, which challenge the traditional position held by the EU on supplementarity. In general, our analyses at the micro level of the allocation methods (across countries and phases) suggest that MS tend to stick with the oncepts and methodologies developed in phase 1, unless these actually contradict rulings by the European Commission. Thus the progress made towards more efficient and more harmonized allocation rules is generally small. With some variation, all NAPs include persistent inefficient rules for closures and new installations which distort dynamic innovation incentives and tend to preserve existing production structures. Observed improvements include a (rather small) increase in auctioning and the use of benchmarking for existing and new installations. Also, the NAPs of a few old MS have simplified special provisions for process-related emissions or combined heat and power. In contrast, new MS have often introduced such provisions in phase 2. We conclude that potentials to improve environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency are far from being tapped. Improvements crucially hinge on the outcome of the European Commission's review process.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFraunhofer-Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung ISI |cKarlsruheen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper Sustainability and Innovation |xS1/2006en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen
dc.subject.stwAllokationen
dc.subject.stwNationalstaaten
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleAn early assessment of national allocation plans for phase 2 of EU emission trading-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610679732en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fisisi:S12006en

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