Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/285070 
Title (translated): 
Privatización y política medioambiental en un oligopolio mixto
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 46 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 173-190
Publisher: 
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía, Santiago de Chile
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the interaction between two political economy decisions by a government: whether to privatize a public firm and what environmental policy to choose (an environmental tax or an emission standard). We find that when market competition is weak the government does not privatize the public firm and sets an environmental tax. When it is intermediate the public firm is not privatized and the government sets an environmental standard. Finally, when market competition is strong the government privatizes the public firm and is indifferent between a tax and a standard.
Subjects: 
Environmental tax
emission standard
mixed oligopoly
privatization
JEL: 
Q58
L13
L32
H2
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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