Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284807 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Regulation & Governance [ISSN:] 1748-5991 [Volume:] 15 [Publisher:] John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd [Place:] Melbourne [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] S83-S101
Publisher: 
John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd, Melbourne
Abstract: 
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self‐interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional problems of opportunism (slacking and capture), each brings pathologies of its own. We explain the behavioral logic of each type of loyalty and analyze the risks and rewards of different intermediary loyalties – both for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with examples drawn from many different realms of regulation and governance.
Subjects: 
delegation
indirect governance
intermediary
intermediary agency
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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