Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284769 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Economic Review [ISSN:] 1468-2354 [Volume:] 63 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 37-61
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We study two‐stage collective decision‐making procedures where in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol‐free equilibrium concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the floor.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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